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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

2 March 1976

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MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Secretariat (Attn: /IC Staff)

FROM : CIA Member, USIB

SUBJECT : CIA Views on the Restructuring of
USIB and its Committee Structure

1. This memorandum responds to Mr. Bush's request that the USIB members give their views on how the USIB structure should be reorganized. The views expressed herein are preliminary and are based on the assumption that the continuity of Community operations requires the maintenance of a Community similar to that of the USIB structure. I would recommend strongly, however, that the Community take this opportunity to conduct a fundamental review of the traditional committee approach with a view to reducing and tightening up these arrangements. We would also be well advised to consider whether other approaches to Community operations would be more effective.

2. I believe that to fulfill the Director's responsibilities of the production of national intelligence the United States Intelligence Board should be reconstituted as a National Intelligence Board (NIB), advisory to the DCI but charged only with substantive matters. The DCI would serve as Chairman of the NIB with his Deputy for CIA as the Vice Chairman and CIA Member. The membership of the NIB is a matter that the DCI will probably want to consider personally and to discuss with the members of the CFI.


3. The attachment presents a brief discussion of my views on the disposition of each of the present USIB Committees. It can be summarized as follows:

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Automatic declassification on
Date Impossible to Determine



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- The purpose and functions of one Committee--the Intelligence Information Handling Committee--should be the subject of a basic re-examination by the Community.
- One Committee--the Critical Collection Problems Committee--should be abolished.
- Three Committees--COMIREX, SIGINT, and the Human Resources Committee--should be restructured. In each case, their responsibilities should be divided so that those elements directly involved in the day-to-day aspects of national intelligence production should be part of the NIB committee structure. Those elements more concerned with overall policy and resource issues should be part of a staff structure supporting the CFI. The precise division would have to be worked out by appropriate officials.
- One Committee--the Security Committee--because of the unique nature of the DCI's responsibilities on security matters should be made a part of the DCI's immediate staff.
- The remaining committees should, in my view, be retained as part of the NIB committee structure.

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Vernon A. Walters
Lieutenant General, USA
CIA Member, USIB

Attachment:

Reorganization of the USIB
Committee Structure

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SUBJECT: CIA Views on the Restructuring of
USIB and its Committee Structure

ADDI/PVWalsh/tb (2 March 1976)

Distribution:

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
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REORGANIZATION OF THE USIB COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

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COMIREX

COMIREX is a unique and singularly useful Community committee which has a mix of responsibilities ranging from day-to-day operational tasking and evaluation of imagery collection operations to the development of major policy reviews and guidance regarding existing and planned imagery systems.

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In terms of personnel resources, COMIREX is by far the largest committee of the present USIB structure, presently having a staff of ☐ CIA positions (with an additional ☐ CIA positions planned for FY-77), in addition to a number of DoD/DIA assignees.

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The present broad mix of COMIREX functions should not be assigned in its entirety to either the CFI or the NIB.

In the CIA view, a sensible and workable division of responsibilities would be:

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a. To assign to the CFI that part of the COMIREX responsibility which is concerned with the major policy issues related to imagery collection and the development of coordinated guidance on the full range of Community needs and priorities to be satisfied by imagery source collection and exploitation programs. This responsibility is presently carried out by the immediate staff and Executive Secretariat of the Chairman, COMIREX.

b. To assign as part of the NIB structure, and administratively subordinate to CIA as a service of common concern, those parts of the COMIREX structure directly concerned with the day-to-day operation of imagery collection systems. These would include the present operating subcommittees--EXSUBCOM and ICRS--as well as the COMIREX ADP Coordinating Group and the COMIREX manning complement.

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c. To preserve the integrity and unified direction of imagery resource and operating issues, the Chairman, COMIREX, though a part of the CFI structure, would also be charged with direction and leadership of those operating elements included in the NIB committee structure.

The advantage of this division is that it gives to the CFI those parts of the COMIREX function most concerned with policy and resource issues without disturbing the close relationship with line production and exploitation elements that are critical to effective functioning of the operating subcommittees of COMIREX. The CIA proposal would also eliminate the duplication of present IC and COMIREX staffing patterns and responsibilities in the imagery field.

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Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC)

In the 27 years of its existence the CCPC has made many valuable contributions through its systematic all-source examination of critical collection problems.

During recent years the creation of a number of Community organizations charged with evaluative functions concerning collection and production programs has obviated the need for the CCPC.

Executive Order 11905 restates the responsibility of the Community to maintain these evaluative functions. The integration of these evaluative functions should not require the creation of a separate Community committee.

Therefore, CIA recommends that the CCPC be permanently dissolved.

Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC)

The EIC functions principally to promote the exchange of information among the economic intelligence producers, the Community, and other economic research units in the Government. It also serves as a means of formulating economic intelligence priorities and requirements so that guidance can be provided to collectors.

In the CIA view the EIC has served well in ensuring that the needs of economic intelligence producers are given adequate attention in a Community otherwise dominated by military concerns.

Although the subcommittee structure should be reviewed with a view to decreasing it, the EIC should be maintained. As an integral part of the economic intelligence production it should function under the general supervision of the NIB.

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Human Resources Committee (HRC)

The HRC is a relative newcomer to the world of USIB committees with responsibilities ranging from the development of intelligence requirements for human source collectors to overall appraisals of human collection programs to provide assessments and guidance.

With the exception of some of its evaluations under the FOCUS assessment program, the HRC has not functioned effectively. It has expanded bureaucratically to the point that it now has 12 full-time positions and an elaborate structure including four subcommittees.

In the CIA view the HRC should be retained but with a considerable reduction in its structure and resources. Those parts of the HRC--the Guidance and Requirements Subcommittee, and the Assessments Subcommittee--which are substantively oriented--should be retained (in a reduced form) in the NIB as a service of common concern. Those parts performing "collection advisory functions" should be abolished.

The product of the NIB Guidance and Assessment groups could provide whatever substantive input would be required by a small counterpart committee in the CFI charged with resources questions relating to human source collection programs.




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Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC)

JAEIC, like other substantively oriented USIB committees, exists primarily to achieve interagency coordination and cooperation in the collection and production of national intelligence on nuclear matters. It also has a special responsibility in monitoring the implementation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

In the CIA view, JAEIC should be retained as presently constituted as a part of the NIB. In this arrangement, it could also provide any support required by the CFI on matters relating to resource allocation.

Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC)

The mission of the STIC has recently been the subject of an intensive Community review. In DCID 3/5, issued on 15 January 1976, this mission was stated, "to provide early warning of foreign scientific or technical advances, . . ." which could affect significantly the national security of national welfare of the United States.

The execution of this mission is principally the responsibility of the scientific intelligence components of the Community. As such it is the CIA view that STIC, like the other production-oriented committees of the Community, be a part of the NIB.

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Given the DCI's responsibilities for establishing effective security policies to protect intelligence sources and methods, and classified intelligence products, it is imperative that the Security Committee be maintained.

The need for a Security Committee is reinforced by Executive Order 11905's assignment to the DCI of specific responsibilities for a program to downgrade and declassify foreign intelligence information.

In exercising the full range of his security responsibilities, the DCI will need advice and assistance on a full time basis of a senior and qualified security professional. This individual will also need the full cooperation and assistance of senior representatives from the security elements of the other intelligence agencies.

CIA recommends that these functions be a responsibility of an Assistant to the DCI on Community Security. Given the unique nature of CIA's security problems, this individual should be a CIA professional security officer. He would also serve as the Chairman of a Security Committee, with essentially the same organization and responsibilities as the present USIB Security Committee.

SIGINT Committee

The SIGINT Committee, although considerably smaller than COMIREX, is similar in its mix of responsibilities. It plays a role in the development of guidance for SIGINT programs, policies and procedures. It also plays a role in facilitating the levying of consumer requirements on SIGINT collection programs and in substantive evaluation of the product of these programs. Some of its activities are related directly to the resource and management concerns of CFI. Others are largely substantively oriented and are strongly dependent for effective operation on close day-to-day working relationships with the substantive producers of the Community.

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In the CIA view the SIGINT Committee, as presently structured, should not be retained solely in the CFI structure or in an NIB structure.

A reasonable and effective division would be for those elements directly concerned with day-to-day substantive matters to be part of the NIB structure. These would include the SIGINT Requirements, Validation and Evaluation Subcommittee (SIRVES) and the SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee (SORS). The remaining parts of the SIGINT Committee with Chairman and Executive Secretariat would be part of the supporting structure of the CFI. It would receive the substantive input necessary to policy and resource determinations from SIRVES and SORS.

Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC)

The WSSIC has a well-defined responsibility for the coordination of requirements and the production of national intelligence on foreign weapons and space systems.

Its responsibilities were recently reviewed and affirmed in DCID 3/4, 15 January 1976. As a substantively oriented committee, it should be retained as part of the NIB.

Intelligence Information Handling Committee (IHC)

The IHC was established in 1968 in recognition of the need to have a mechanism to facilitate a coordinated Community approach in the adoption of technology for information handling systems. Given the high costs and importance of these systems, the need for a central point to monitor them is accepted. Whether the IHC is the proper or most effective approach to the problem is debatable.

The IHC functions principally as a forum for the exchange of views and discussion of approaches to information handling

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systems. For a number of reasons, including its separation from the substantive components of the Community, it has not made much progress in the promotion of coordinated and common solutions to information handling. The effectiveness of the IHC has also been diluted over the years by its extension into a broad number of functions such as training, computer security, national/tactical relationships, and format standardization programs, which are beyond its capabilities or duplicative of other Community efforts.

In the CIA view the restructuring of USIB presents an excellent opportunity for a fundamental review of the charter of the IHC. It is recommended that an inter-Agency committee be established to conduct this review. This committee should be enjoined to delimit the functions of the IHC, to ensure a proper substantive input into its proceeding and to effect a program that will require less resources than the present IHC.

SALT Monitoring Group

Although not a formal USIB committee the SALT Monitoring Group was created by USIB and is responsible to the DCI for guidance and supervision of intelligence monitoring activities required under the strategic arms limitations agreements with the USSR.

The critical nature of this function and its complete dependence upon the substantive components of the Community dictate that it should be maintained as a Community undertaking.

CIA recommends that the SALT Monitoring Group be maintained as presently organized and as part of the NIB structure.

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